A Due Measure of Fear in Criminal Judgment by Berger, Benjamin L.




Volume 41 (2008) Article 9
A Due Measure of Fear in Criminal Judgment
Benjamin L. Berger
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, bberger@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Berger, Benjamin L.. "A Due Measure of Fear in Criminal Judgment." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional
Cases Conference 41. (2008).
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol41/iss1/9
 
A Due Measure of Fear in 
Criminal Judgment 
Benjamin L. Berger∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the long history of the common law trial, criminal judgment has 
always been a fearful event. This is obviously true for the accused who, 
until these modes of adjudication were effectively abolished in 1215 C.E., 
was likely to undergo trial by ordeal. Whether by hot iron, cold water or, 
for the high-status accused, trial by battle, the event of judgment itself was 
a cause for trepidation on the part of the accused, as were the mortal 
consequences of a finding of guilt. However, James Whitman has 
elegantly shown that, after the end of the ordeals, this fearsomeness was 
no less acute for the adjudicator, who experienced a deep moral anxiety in 
criminal judgment. An appreciation of this anxiety is key to understanding 
the development of the criminal trial in the common law world.1 Whitman 
explains that the act of judgment was understood to be a perilous and risky 
business, indeed. “Early modern Christians”, he writes, “experienced great 
anxiety about the dangers that acts of judgment presented for the soul” 
because “any sinful misstep committed by a judge in the course of judging 
‘built him a mansion in Hell’”.2 This sense of the peril in judgment was 
greatest for those engaged in imposing criminal punishments — the so-
called “blood punishments” — because the individual who judged, 
whether professional judge or juror, was responsible for and was polluted 
by this bloodshed, wielding the sword just as the soldier did. Phrases rang 
in the ears of these judges and jurors with a moral resonance that inspired 
trepidation of a form we find hard to imagine today: “Judge not, that ye be 
                                                                                                             
∗ Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. Many thanks to Jamie 
Cameron, Hamar Foster and Robert Leckey for their comments on earlier drafts of this piece, and to 
Alison Latimer and Lyndsay Watson for their research assistance. 
1 James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the 
Criminal Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007) [hereinafter “The Origins of Reasonable 
Doubt”]. 
2 Id., at 3. 
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not judged”;3 “they that take the sword shall perish with the sword”.4 The 
stakes were, thus, the highest imaginable not only for the accused but for 
the judge — the fate of his soul was at issue in each act of criminal 
judgment. As Whitman explains, this fear led not only to a complex 
theology of judging but also to techniques of moral comfort for judges and 
jurors, techniques that gave rise to the characteristic features of our 
modern criminal trial. The jury trial itself was a means of shuffling moral 
(and immortal) peril for judgment from the judge to the juror. Similarly, 
the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the so-called “golden 
thread”5 of our own criminal justice system, was not a device of factual 
proof designed to protect the accused but, rather, a device of moral 
comfort used to encourage conviction by assuring the juror that, so long as 
the juror experienced no reasonable doubt, the juror’s soul was safe. So 
although our image of the bloody and vicious forms of criminal judgment 
of our common law past is not far from the truth, we often fail to recall the 
fearsome anxiety that infused the system, an anxiety that meant that 
although the progenitors to our modern judges and juries “did wield the 
sword of vengeance … they did not find it easy to do so. On the contrary: 
they struggled mightily with the moral duties of judging”.6  
Despite the welcome loss of officially countenanced blood 
punishments in Canada, great anxiety on the part of the accused facing 
criminal judgment remains. In the moment of criminal judgment, she or 
he stands before the awe-full power of the law, a power and force that is 
an omnipresent feature of all dimensions of state law but that is naked in 
the field of criminal law unlike any other. And, of course, the accused 
still faces consequences that have every capacity to destroy the life, if no 
longer the physical body, of the convict. There is still much fear in being 
judged; time has not severed this link between the medieval and the 
modern accused. 
What, though, of the moral anxiety of the judge? Is there still a clear 
feeling — and do we still see the jurisprudential artefacts — of deep 
judicial anxiety about the dangers associated with the act of criminal 
judgment? My sense is that, increasingly, we do not. There are, of 
course, a number of reasons why this is so. We have taken a rather 
technocratic turn in the criminal law, viewing it more as an instrument of 
                                                                                                             
3 Matthew 7:1 (King James Version). 
4 Matthew 26:52 (King James Version). 
5 Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462; R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 
S.C.J. No. 77, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lifchus”]. 
6 The Origins of Reasonable Doubt, supra, note 1, at 30. 
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public policy, harm-reduction and social rehabilitation than one of moral 
judgment and state violence. Judges can also now find a brand of moral 
solace in the existence of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.7 One can imagine that criminal law rights serve a kind of 
modern moral comfort function, assuring the judge that if the terms of 
the (overwhelmingly procedural)8 rights protections are satisfied, so too 
are the key modern moral imperatives for which these documents 
capaciously stand. Most obviously, however, the salience of the kind of 
religious thought that inspired this anxiety in judgment in the past has 
diminished with modern secularization. This historical fear was 
associated with the saturation of public and private lives of the judge and 
juror alike with the world view and absolute authority of Christian moral 
theology. Most people — including judges and jurors — no longer move 
in their lives trembling with fear for the eternal fate of their souls. “In 
many aspects of life this is a good and liberating thing: humans who no 
longer quake and tremble are humans who live richer lives in many 
ways.”9 There is a certain freedom to be found in a life not ruled by fear. 
However, in matters of criminal judgment, matters that still involve 
such grave consequences, I am less sanguine about the apparent loss of 
judicial anxiety. Over time, this fear and anxiety in criminal adjudication 
has served a function: it has helped to restrain the violent hand of the 
criminal law. Be it in the development of demanding burdens and 
standards of proof or in the creation of procedural rules such as jury 
unanimity, this sense of moral discomfort in the exercise of criminal 
judgment has tended to translate into a kind of parsimony in the use of 
the criminal law. This restraint did not, of course, leave the law unable to 
address pressing social ills; it merely made the criminal law a tool of last 
resort, wielded with caution. Today, however, we see Parliament’s 
proliferation of crimes and toughening of sentences. In the courts, we 
                                                                                                             
7 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
8 It is interesting to note that, both in the European Continental legal tradition and in 
common law history, resort to procedure was one means of absolving the judge of moral 
responsibility for the act of judgment. See The Origins of Reasonable Doubt, supra, note 1, at 94, 
146. 
9 The Origins of Reasonable Doubt, supra, note 1, at 7. 
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have watched burdens reverse from Crown to accused,10 confessions 
have become more readily admissible,11 and there has been a slide to less 
demanding forms of mens rea.12 These and other legal and jurisprudential 
moves seem to reflect a relative modern comfort with criminal judgment, 
a comfort that I find troubling. With Whitman, I wonder if, with the 
lessening in moral fear around criminal judgment, “we have slowly been 
losing the capacity to gaze into our own breasts and ask ourselves hard 
questions about when and how we have the right to punish others”.13 
When Justice Bertha Wilson was appointed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, she had a “serious dearth of experience in criminal law” and is 
said to have claimed that she did not find the criminal cases terribly 
interesting.14 Although, working closely with Justice G.A. Martin, she 
developed an appreciation for the criminal law, she wrote few criminal 
                                                                                                             
10 See Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2005), at 401, where Stuart concludes that “Canada and the Criminal Code in particular is 
conspicuous for its overuse of reverse onus clauses” and that “[i]n its s. 1 decisions on reverse 
onuses, the Supreme Court appears to have been inconsistent with the minimum intrusion test and 
also far too accepting of arguments of law enforcement expediency.” See text accompanying 
footnotes 59 and 60, infra.. 
11 See, e.g., R. v. Spencer, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Spencer”], in which Deschamps J., for a majority of the Court, imposed an extremely high 
threshold for breaching the common law confession rule, a standard that seems even higher than the 
already demanding one enunciated in R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
The Spencer majority found no error in the trial judge’s statement of the law as requiring that, to 
offend the common law confession rule, an inducement “must be so overbearing that it can be said 
that the detainee has lost any meaningful independent ability to choose to remain silent, and has 
become a mere tool in the hands of the police” (emphasis in Spencer) (at para. 27). Justice Fish’s 
forceful dissent, arguing that the effect of the majority’s judgment is to turn the common law 
confession rule into an operating mind test, is compelling. See also R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 
2179, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 99 
(S.C.C.), in which Laskin J., for the Court, concluded that the fact that unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence is conscriptive and non-discoverable ought not to end the s. 24(2) exclusion analysis. This 
decision, which picked up on the separate concurring reasons of LeBel J. in R. v. Orbanski; R. v. 
Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), is currently under appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada.  
12 After citing Dickson J.’s (as he then was) judgment in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), 
[1978] S.C.J. No. 59, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.), as the high-water mark in the Court’s 
expressed commitment to subjective forms of fault for criminal offences, Don Stuart writes that a 
“review of the current law on fault will reveal that a low level objective standard is pervasive for 
public welfare offences and that, while the subjective approach is still required for many crimes, for 
a significant number of crimes there are now less demanding standards of fault”. (Don Stuart, 
Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007), at 170 
[hereinafter “Canadian Criminal Law”]). Kent Roach writes of the “increasing acceptance of 
objective fault as a form of mens rea” (Kent Roach, Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2004), at 165). 
13 The Origins of Reasonable Doubt, supra, note 1, at 7. 
14 Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001), at 88 [hereinafter “Judging Bertha Wilson”]. 
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judgments while at the Ontario Court of Appeal.15 Most can recall one or 
two of her most celebrated criminal law judgments from her time at the 
Supreme Court of Canada, but this is not the aspect of her jurisprudence 
that is remembered most sharply. In this chapter, my purpose is to look 
at her contributions to Canadian criminal law in light of this pressing 
question that I have introduced, the question of what J.H. Baker has 
called the “agonies of decision”.16 In doing so, my hope is that a different 
light will be shone on Justice Wilson’s work in the criminal law, one that 
illuminates the way in which she offered a principled and powerful 
resource for thinking about the nature and moral burdens of criminal 
judgment. This piece will examine three of Justice Wilson’s key 
interventions in modern Canadian criminal law, specifically in the law of 
criminal defences, in light of this theme. Certain of the judgments that I 
will examine have been the subject of considerable academic attention. 
My purpose is not to rehearse these debates but, rather, to offer a way of 
reading these cases — both individually and together — in a different 
light. Looking closely at her decisions in R. v. Perka,17 R. v. Chaulk18 and 
R. v. Lavallee19 reveals a judge who is palpably aware of the 
complexities of the lives that appear before her in a criminal case, the 
violence of the criminal law, and the consequent ethical imperative to 
proceed with caution and humility. It is my view that we should want 
judges who, seized with a keen sense of the limits and consequences of 
the criminal law, tremble at the moment of judgment. One can read 
Justice Wilson’s criminal law jurisprudence as embodying this due 
measure of fear in criminal judgment.  
II. THE IRREDUCIBLE COMPLEXITY OF LAW AND LIFE 
The first of Justice Wilson’s criminal law interventions that I want to 
take up is, indeed, one that is relatively well known. Perka20 is 
remembered by most as much for its intriguing facts as for the 
                                                                                                             
15 Id., at 92. 
16 J.H. Baker, Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol. 6 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), at 47. Baker uses this term in the course of describing the manner in which “judges sought 
refuge from the agonies of decision” by following the letter of procedure and — creating a distinction 
that is still at least notionally with us today — leaving all questions of fact entirely to the jury.  
17 [1984] S.C.J. No. 40, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Perka”]. 
18 [1990] S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaulk”]. 
19 [1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lavallee”]. 
20 Perka, supra, note 17. 
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jurisprudence arising from the case. The facts read like a hypothetical 
conjured in the imagination of a professor of moral philosophy. The 
accused were charged with importing narcotics and of possession for the 
purposes of trafficking when the police found them camped, along with 
their boats and 33.49 tons of marijuana worth between 6 and 7 million 
dollars, in a cove on the west coast of Vancouver Island called “No 
Name Bay”. At trial, the defence led evidence that the accused had been 
engaged in an operation to smuggle the narcotics from South America to 
Alaska. While en route, the ship carrying the illicit cargo, the 
“Samarkanda”, suffered a series of mechanical difficulties and, when the 
weather took a turn for the worse, the ship headed for shelter in No 
Name Bay. Owing to a malfunctioning depth-sounder, the ship grounded 
on a rock and the captain, fearing for the crew and the cargo, ordered 
everyone and everything ashore. Yet by bringing the cargo ashore, the 
crew would seem to be committing the offence of illegal importation of 
narcotics. 
At trial, the defence argued necessity, on the basis that the captain 
and crew had no choice but to seek temporary refuge in Canada. The 
judge instructed the jury on the then-still incipient defence of necessity 
and the jury acquitted. The principal issue on appeal before the Supreme 
Court of Canada was whether the judge had properly charged the jury on 
this defence.21 The Court concluded that he had not. Specifically, the trial 
judge failed to draw the jury’s attention to “the question of whether there 
existed any other reasonable responses to the peril that were not 
illegal”,22 the requirement for a successful defence of necessity that there 
be no reasonable alternatives to the course of action leading to the 
charges. 
The result at the Supreme Court was unanimous, but the reasoning 
was not. Chief Justice Dickson, on behalf of Ritchie, Chouinard, and 
Lamer JJ., wrote the majority decision. Justice Wilson wrote separate 
concurring reasons dealing with a narrow question: whether the defence 
of necessity ought to be conceived of solely as an excuse, as Dickson 
C.J.C. held, or whether the door ought to be left open for a way of 
thinking about necessity as a justification. Although not essential to the 
outcome of the case, this debate between Dickson C.J.C. and Wilson J. is 
                                                                                                             
21 Chief Justice Dickson’s majority reasons also dealt with the question of when a “new” 
issue may and may not be raised on appeal and dismissed the appellants’ other legal argument — 
the “botanical defence”.  
22 Perka, supra, note 17, at 254. 
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what captured and has since held the attention of commentators, the case 
becoming a favourite for theorists of the criminal law.  
Separate concurring reasons are always particularly interesting 
because, being penned in spite of agreement on the result, they suggest a 
deeply held difference on a principled point of jurisprudence. In this 
case, however, the split is particularly interesting for a couple of reasons. 
First, Wilson J. not only wrote alone, but separately from two of her 
colleagues with whom, on criminal law matters, she is often closely 
associated — Brian Dickson and Antonio Lamer. There is a tendency 
among commentators to group these three judges as together representing 
the more accused-rights focused sentiment that characterized the Court’s 
early criminal Charter jurisprudence. There is no doubt that the three 
often concurred on matters of criminal law and can be so characterized. 
But Wilson J.’s split from the other two members of this triumvirate in 
Perka23 suggests that, whatever the jurisprudential affinities, Wilson J. 
had a distinct take on questions of criminal law that is not reducible to 
simple characterization in terms of “liberal” or “conservative” with 
respect to the rights of the accused. Something else is at play in her 
separate reasons in Perka. 
The second interesting feature of this split was that the issues about 
which she wrote in passionate disagreement — whether necessity is 
merely an excuse or can also serve as a justification — have little 
practical import for the accused or the operation of the criminal law. If 
an accused is successful in pleading a defence that results in a verdict of 
not guilty, it generally matters little to her or him whether the defence is 
theorized as an excuse or a justification. Perka24 thus becomes an 
especially interesting case for coming to terms with Wilson J.’s 
conception of the criminal law. She agreed with Dickson C.J.C.’s 
conclusion that the trial judge had misdirected the jury and that a new 
trial was needed. Yet she saw fit to write separate reasons differing on a 
point of obiter that was, furthermore, of little practical consequence. 
What was at stake for her in these reasons?  
Despite the unanimity of result and the marginal practical 
consequence of the point of difference between the majority and 
minority, the two judgments in Perka25 cut a persistently large figure in 
Canadian criminal law theory. Why is this so? One immediately gets a 
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sense of the uniqueness of this case and the beginnings of an answer to 
this question when, in his discussion of the central point of contention in 
the case, three of Dickson C.J.C.’s first four citations are to Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics,26 Hobbes’s Leviathan27 and Kant’s Metaphysical 
Elements of Justice.28 Debates about whether to think of a defence as an 
excuse or a justification are really claims about the moral shape and 
scope of the criminal law. For this reason, legal theorists and 
philosophers have generated a robust literature creating, splitting and 
distinguishing concepts (and sometimes hairs) in an effort to come to a 
satisfying account of the divide between excuse and justification.29 Perka 
is a rare instance of a case that engages in this literature, crossing the 
beams of law and philosophy, a fact that has secured for it a certain 
prominence in the philosophical and theoretical literature about 
Canadian criminal law.  
But Perka30 is also a rare opportunity to see judges making more or 
less explicit claims about the nature of choice, of judgment and of 
morality in the criminal law. Beyond a philosophical analysis of the 
quality of respective views on the nature of justification and excuse, it is 
here that I see the stakes of the case for Wilson J. Her reasons gesture 
towards a fundamental difference with her colleagues about how to think 
about the appropriate reach of the criminal law’s claims regarding the 
rightness of conduct in a world that she seems so clearly to appreciate is 
filled with agonies arising from the complexities of lived experience.  
Chief Justice Dickson acknowledged that there were two possible 
views that one could take of the defence of necessity: one could view the 
defence as a justification or as an excuse. For Dickson C.J.C., the 
essence of a justification is that it “challenges the wrongfulness of an 
action which technically constitutes a crime”.31 For these kinds of 
actions, he argued, “people are often praised, as motivated by some great 
                                                                                                             
26 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, trans. by J.A.K. Thomson (London: Penguin 
Books, 2004). 
27 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: with selected excerpts from the Latin edition of 1668, ed. by 
Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1994). 
28 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, 2d ed. by John Ladd (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Co., 1999). 
29 See, e.g., J.C. Smith, Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (London: Stevens, 
1989); Michael Louis Corrado, ed., Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law: A Collection of 
Essays (New York: Garland Pub., 1994); George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1978) [hereinafter “Rethinking Criminal Law”]. 
30 Perka, supra, note 17. 
31 Id., at 246. 
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or noble object”.32 Apparently criminal acts that are nevertheless justified 
are matters that also enjoy a certain social approval. By contrast, an 
excuse “concedes the wrongfulness of the action but asserts that the 
circumstances under which it was done are such that it ought not to be 
attributed to the actor”.33 The key divide between an excuse and a 
justification, then, is that the former are acts that the law insists are 
“wrong”, even if not to be punished, whereas the label “justified” is to be 
reserved for those actions whose “wrongfulness” the criminal law is 
unwilling to declare.  
With the conceptual distinction so established, Dickson C.J.C. 
expressed his deep skepticism and discomfort with the notion of 
necessity ever serving as a justification. For him, this would be to 
suggest that “ostensibly illegal acts can be validated on the basis of their 
expediency” and “would import an undue subjectivity into the criminal 
law” that might turn the law of necessity into “the last resort of 
scoundrels”.34 Rather, necessity is based “on a realistic assessment of 
human weakness” and, therefore, is to be conceived of as an excuse. We 
refuse to punish the accused who successfully pleads necessity not 
because we doubt the wrongfulness of the action but, rather, to recognize 
that we cannot expect a person, subject to the duress of circumstance, to 
act otherwise. For Dickson C.J.C., faced with an offence committed in 
conditions of necessity, we can remain comfortable with the criminal 
law’s categorical claim that the act was wrong, even while we excuse the 
actor on account of the intrinsic frailties of human nature. Secure in the 
criminal law’s ex ante decision that this action is invariably wrong, we 
pardon, but we do not praise.  
The concept that Dickson C.J.C. introduced to support this 
conception of necessity is the now-constitutionalized notion of moral 
involuntariness,35 drawn from George Fletcher’s theory of the criminal 
law.36 The idea here is that, when an excuse obtains, we refuse to punish 
because, although the act was “wrong”, circumstances combined with 
human frailty mean that the accused had no real choice whether to 
commit the offence or not. Such actions are “morally involuntary”. 
Implicit in this concept is the idea that, had we been more resilient than 
                                                                                                             
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id., at 248. 
35 R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ruzic”]. 
36 Rethinking Criminal Law, supra, note 29. 
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the average person to the duress of circumstance, we would have chosen 
to do otherwise. This foregrounding of a notion of choice at the core of 
the excuse led Dickson C.J.C. to insist that a criterion for a successful 
claim of necessity must be that there was no reasonable legal alternative 
than to act as the accused did, for “[i]f there is a reasonable legal 
alternative to disobeying the law, then the decision to disobey becomes a 
voluntary one.”37 
The sole target of Wilson J.’s separate concurring reasons in Perka 
was this idea that “the appropriate jurisprudential basis on which to 
premise the defence of necessity is exclusively that of excuse”.38 Justice 
Wilson accepted Dickson C.J.C.’s characterization of the distinction 
between excuses and justifications as turning on the wrongfulness of the 
act. She further accepted that “excuse speaks to the compassion of the 
court for the actor”,39 though she emphasized that the basis for this 
compassion was the recognition that there was no purpose in punishing 
given that the act in question was one “which no rational person would 
avoid”.40 Where she, alone, broke from Dickson C.J.C.’s reasoning was 
in her insistence that there could be circumstances in which the accused 
acted rightfully by breaking the criminal law out of necessity. This, I 
suggest, reflects much about her posture towards the criminal law and 
criminal judgment.  
Sharing Dickson C.J.C.’s concern about the potential for undue 
subjectivity thereby creeping into the criminal law, Wilson J. was clear 
to limit her imaginings to those circumstances in which an individual 
was faced with conflicting duties. Moreover, she insisted on the 
distinction between “ethical considerations of the ‘charitable and the 
good’” and “duties imposed by law”.41 To serve as a basis for a 
justificatory claim of necessity, the duty conflicting with that of obeying 
the criminal law would have to be one recognized by law. Finally, if a 
choice made between conflicting duties that leads one to ostensibly 
break the criminal law is to be called “rightful”, Wilson J. reasoned that 
there must be a proportionality between the duty discharged and that 
breached. Assessing this proportionality would require a court to 
“somehow attempt to come to grips with the nature of the rights and 
                                                                                                             
37 Perka, supra, note 17, at 252. 
38 Id., at 268. 
39 Id., at 269. 
40 Id., at 273. 
41 Id., at 277. 
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duties being assessed”,42 leading to a conclusion that the actions of the 
accused “can be said to represent a furtherance of … the principle of the 
universality of rights”.43  
There is a great deal of fodder for the criminal theorist or legal 
philosopher in this debate. Pivotal to me, however, is Dickson C.J.C.’s 
claim that, in this area of the law, “[t]he question … is never whether 
what the accused has done is wrongful. It is always and by definition, 
wrongful.”44 Justice Wilson’s decision in Perka can be read as levelled 
against this single claim to which she could not accede. The majority 
judgment, which remains our law in Canada, closed a door that Wilson J. 
earnestly felt needed to be kept open. This call to keep the door open, I 
argue, expresses a basic disposition towards criminal judgment. Justice 
Wilson’s reasons are built around the tacit idea that lived reality is too 
complex to admit of categorical claims about rightness or wrongness 
based on ex ante judgments of the criminal law. In her more generous 
conception of the defence of necessity, her judgment counsels the 
adjudicator to take a complex and self-critical posture towards the 
adequacy — and desirability — of the letter of the criminal law as a 
proxy for our moral assessments.  
The duties — legal and otherwise — to which we are subject are 
many and the manner in which they might conflict is unpredictable. 
Justice Wilson invoked the case of an individual who trespasses in order 
to rescue a person to whom he owes a legal duty of care.45 Are we so 
certain of the criminal law’s ex ante normative assessments to claim that 
such an act is wrongful? She drew on the facts of R. v. Morgentaler,46 a 
case that clearly cast its shadow on the issues raised and the legal 
reasoning in Perka, arguing that “if one subscribes to the viewpoint 
articulated by Laskin C.J.C. in Morgentaler … and perceives a doctor’s 
defence to an abortion charge as his legal obligation to treat the 
mother”,47 then it becomes far from clear where the “right” lies.48 Indeed, 
                                                                                                             
42 Id., at 278. 
43 Id. 
44 Id., at 254. 
45 Citing Mouse’s Case (1608), 12 Co. Rep. 63. She also invoked R. v. Walker, [1979] O.J. 
No. 4593, 48 C.C.C. (2d) 126 (Ont. Co. Ct.).  
46 [1976] S.C.J. No. 48, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616 (S.C.C.). 
47 Perka, supra, note 17, at 276. 
48 It is, of course, tempting to see in these remarks a foreshadowing of her subsequent 1988 
decision in the Morgentaler saga, one of her most passionate interventions in the intersection of 
criminal and constitutional law (R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Morgentaler”]). 
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as one senses the spirit of these examples, it becomes hard not to argue 
that by limiting her argument to cases of conflicts between the 
commands of the criminal law and legally recognized duties, she 
sacrificed the full coherence of her vision in order to forestall the 
floodgates concern that anything more embracing would render the law 
of necessity Dickson C.J.C.’s “last resort of scoundrels”. By her own 
admission, in insisting on a legally recognized duty, she excluded the 
case of the good Samaritan who trespasses to rescue a stranger, to whom 
no such duty is owed.49 Surely this person is also deserving of our moral 
praise and is a perverse subject of criminal punishment. 
Overall, however, her reasons in Perka manifest discomfort with 
absolute confidence in the normative claims of the criminal law. They 
work hard to strike an appropriate balance between objectivity in the 
criminal law and the need to leave a space in which we can insist that the 
adjudicator — whether judge or jury — critically assess the contextual 
rightness of an act. What’s more, her reasons reflect unease with 
Dickson C.J.C.’s treatment of the concept of choice in criminal law. 
Faced with the criminal law, the scope of responsible human conduct is 
broader, and the terrain more complex, than simply the choice to obey 
and the exigency-produced absence of real choice. Wrestling with the 
concepts of necessity, excuse and justification, she was simply not 
convinced that praise is never due to the lawbreaker.  
Justice Wilson regarded Perka as “one of the most interesting 
judgments she ever wrote”50 given, in part, the opportunity it afforded 
her to engage with philosophical literature, something she very much 
enjoyed. To be sure, the issues offer much of academic interest. Yet the 
practical impact of the law would have been virtually the same had the 
Court adopted her view of necessity as potentially justificatory.51 To 
return to the question, then: what was at stake in penning this separate 
concurring judgment? What can we make of this decision? I argue that 
Wilson J.’s reasons in Perka can be read as reflecting a posture towards 
criminal judgment, an attitude that demands a margin of modesty borne 
                                                                                                             
49 Perka, supra, note 17, at 276. 
50 Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001), at 279. 
51 Conceiving of the defence of necessity as excuse or justification might have some impact 
on doctrines of party liability and could affect civil liability or have implications for other non-
criminal areas. See, e.g., the English “conjoined twins” case of A (Children), [2000] 4 All E.R. 961, 
[2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 254. I have previously discussed my views on the defence of necessity in 
Benjamin L. Berger, “A Choice Among Values: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives on the 
Defence of Necessity” (2002) 39(4) Alta. L.R. 848. 
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of the moral complexities that the criminal law must confront. Her 
insistence on keeping open the possibility of understanding necessity as 
a justification recognized the unpredictable and unforeseeable nature of 
the circumstances with which the criminal law must contend, and the 
consequent need for the possibility of a way to speak about morally 
laudable conduct that breaches the letter of the criminal law. She sought 
to deny the criminal law the authority to exhaust the possible 
characterizations of actions that breach its terms simply as either 
“punishable” or the product of “human frailty”. In some circumstances, 
she insisted, it might be that to break the criminal law is the positively 
right thing to do. If it is an uncomfortable and complex claim for the law 
to digest, such is the complexity of life and the consequent need for 
humility in criminal judgment.  
III. THE SAFER PATH IN CRIMINAL JUDGMENT 
In his discussion of the tremendous moral anxiety experienced by 
early modern Christians involved in criminal judgment, James Whitman 
describes a particularly influential school of moral theology that would 
develop over the course of the central Middle Ages and would 
contribute, in complex ways, to the shape of our modern criminal trial. 
The anxiety experienced by our progenitor judges and jurors turned on 
the question of doubt. Doubt, at this time, was dangerous. The world was 
filled with possibilities for pollution and sin, all of which threatened the 
soul. In a perilous world like this, to act while experiencing doubt was to 
put the soul in eternal peril. The problem was sharply put by Pope 
Gregory the Great: “Grave satis est et indecens, ut in re dubia certa 
detur sentential”: “It is a grave and unseemly business to give a 
judgment that purports to be certain when the matter is doubtful.”52 In 
the 12th and 13th centuries, the “safer way” school of moral theology 
developed to respond to the problem of knowing how to act in 
circumstances of uncertainty that posed great moral peril. The doctrine 
of the safer path was simple: “in cases of doubt, ‘in dubiis,’ one should 
act in such a way as to minimize the possibility of pollution.”53 The 
theologians of the safer path spun a theory of degrees of certainty 
ranging from “doubt”, through suspicion and opinion, to the highest 
                                                                                                             
52 James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the 
Criminal Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), at 116. 
53 Id., at 117.  
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certainty, “moral certainty”.54 In matters of practical doubt — doubt 
about how one should act — one should always follow the safer path. 
When it came to criminal judgment, and the anxiety-inducing blood guilt 
and moral peril that accompanied it, the safer path doctrine proved 
formative for centuries to come. Its application to legal judgment was 
clear enough — if one had doubt, the safer path was not to judge. 
Whitman convincingly shows that, as late as the 18th century, jurors 
were still influenced by this theological conception and refused to 
convict if seized with even the smallest doubt. This is the soil from 
which the idea of proof beyond a reasonable doubt arose; proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt was a theological concept devised to comfort the 
conscience of the juror in the context of a justice system that needed 
them to act. The safer path should be taken, certainly, but your soul was 
safe if you acted with no reasonable doubt. 
In the modern Canadian criminal justice system, the concept of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is expressed in the Charter protection of the 
presumption of innocence, found in section 11(d). In Lifchus,55 Cory J. 
accounted for the vital importance of the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt on the basis that “it is inextricably linked to that basic 
premise which is fundamental to all criminal trials: the presumption of 
innocence.”56 The concepts are the twin key pillars of our criminal 
justice system: “If the presumption of innocence is the golden thread of 
criminal justice then proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the silver and 
these two threads are forever intertwined in the fabric of criminal law.”57 
In a simile whose tragic undertones might suggest that the metaphor got 
slightly away from him, Cory J. described the two concepts as “forever 
as closely linked as Romeo with Juliet or Oberon with Titania and they 
must be presented together as a unit”.58 Today, our moral comfort has 
more to do with seeking to ensure that the morally innocent are not 
convicted than with overtly theological concerns. Nevertheless, the 
concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt continues to serve its role as 
the marker for the “safer path”, now joined by the presumption of 
innocence.  
                                                                                                             
54 In R. v. Lifchus, [1997] S.C.J. No. 77, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320 (S.C.C.), the Court 
commented that this phrase — “moral certainty” — ought not to be used when explaining the 
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.  
55 Id. 
56 Id., at para. 27. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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Yet in recent years, in the realm of criminal defences, we have 
watched as the Court has increasingly seen fit to justify breaches of the 
presumption of innocence. In R. v. Daviault,59 the Court held that an 
accused would bear the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, 
intoxication akin to automatism. So holding requires, in effect, that the 
accused prove the absence of minimal mens rea. In R. v. Stone,60 
Bastarache J. held that the burden of proof for automatism would, 
thenceforth, lie on the accused. Most recently, the Court has held that 
proving all six elements of the newly recognized defence of officially 
induced error would be a burden borne by the accused.61 One might have 
been forgiven for predicting that the Charter would have assiduously 
protected this core cautionary principle — for that is what it is — in 
Canadian criminal law. Indeed, it appeared that this might be so when 
the Court struck down certain reverse onus provisions.62 But it all 
seemed rather less certain after the Court decided Chaulk63 to the sole but 
strenuous objection of Justice Bertha Wilson.  
Chaulk64 involved the case of Robert Chaulk and Francis Morrissette 
who, in the early fall of 1995, entered a Winnipeg home, robbed it of its 
contents, and stabbed and bludgeoned the home’s occupant to death. The 
two accused were aged 15 and 16, respectively, at the time of the 
murder. Having made full confessions, their sole defence was that they 
were insane at the time of the offence and, hence, were entitled to be 
found not guilty by reason of insanity, in the terms of section 16(4) of 
the Criminal Code, as it stood at the time.65 The basis for their claim was 
that, suffering from a form of paranoid psychosis, the two believed they 
“had the power to rule the world and that the killing was a necessary 
                                                                                                             
59 [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Daviault”].  
60 [1999] S.C.J. No. 27, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stone”]. At para. 180, 
Bastarache J. justified his newly fashioned burden on the accused on the basis that automatism is 
easily feigned, that the knowledge rests with the accused, and that to do otherwise would be too 
onerous for the Crown. Justice Binnie objected strenuously to this reasoning. 
61 Lévis (City) v. Tétreault; Lévis (City) v. 2629-4470 Québec inc., [2006] S.C.J. No. 12, 
[2006] 1 S.C.R. 420, at para. 26 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tétreault”]. For both intoxication akin to 
automatism and officially induced error the Court reasoned that reversal was needed because the 
accused is the “only one capable” of adducing the evidence: R. v. Jorgensen, [1995] S.C.J. No. 92, 
[1995] 4 S.C.R. 55, at para. 36 (S.C.C.), per Lamer C.J.C. See Daviault, supra, note 59, at 101. 
62 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].  
63 [1990] S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 (S.C.C.). 
64 Id. 
65 The insanity scheme has since been substantially reworked, shifting the language from 
that of “insanity” to “mental disorder” and instituting a more comprehensive and less discretionary 
treatment scheme for those found to be not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder. 
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means to that end”.66 They were aware that Canadian law prohibited the 
act, but believed that the law did not apply to them. The jury convicted 
them of first degree murder. 
This sad case raised a number of issues before the Supreme Court of 
Canada, two of particular interest to the law of mental disorder. The first 
was the meaning to be given to the word “wrong” in the statutory 
demand that, for the defence of insanity to prevail, the accused must 
show that he or she was “incapable of appreciating the nature and quality 
of an act or omission or of knowing that an act or omission is wrong”.67 
Counsel for the accused argued that, although they knew that the murder 
was illegal, these two disturbed young men did not know that it was 
“wrong” in the sense of it being immoral. Although McLachlin J. (as she 
then was) dissented, arguing that “wrong” contemplated either moral or 
legal wrongness, the majority of the Court accepted the appellants’ 
argument, and ordered a new trial. The second issue, and the one on 
which I will focus here, concerned section 16(4) of the Code, which 
created the so-called “presumption of sanity” (now found in section 
16(2)), stating that “everyone shall, until the contrary is proved, be 
presumed to be and to have been sane”. This provision had been 
interpreted as codifying the long-standing common law rule that, if an 
accused sought to rely upon the defence of insanity, the burden lay on 
him to establish the defence on a balance of probabilities. The appellants 
argued that this provision, and the underlying common law rule, 
offended the presumption of innocence protected by section 11(d) of the 
Charter, a breach that could not be justified. The burden, they argued, 
should — as with all other defences at the time — be the Crown’s, 
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not 
insane once an evidentiary foundation for the defence had been laid. 
Eight members of the Court rejected this argument. In so doing, they 
moved with the momentum of Anglo-Canadian criminal law history. 
Since at least M’Naughten’s Case,68 decided in 1843, the common law 
had placed this burden on the accused. This common law rule was 
reflected in our original 1892 Criminal Code and had been part of the 
statutory defence ever since. In her dissenting reasons, McLachlin J. 
denied that this reverse onus even offended the presumption of 
                                                                                                             
66 Chaulk, supra, note 63, at 1314. 
67 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 16(1) (emphasis added). 
68 (1843), 8 E.R. 718 (H.L.). Justice McLachlin claimed that the principled foundation for 
the rule had an even deeper historical pedigree, stating that “[t]he criminal law, from time 
immemorial, has presumed that persons are sane and responsible” (Chaulk, supra, note 63, at 1404). 
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innocence. Preferring to view sanity as a basic precondition to criminal 
responsibility, McLachlin J. argued that insanity did not speak to guilt 
and, hence, could not offend the presumption of innocence. By contrast, 
Lamer C.J.C., writing for the majority of the Court, argued that section 
16(4) offended the presumption of innocence because it put the onus on 
the accused to prove a defence that precludes a finding of guilt — “it 
permits a conviction in spite of a reasonable doubt in the mind of the 
trier of fact as to the guilt of the accused”.69 Yet he concluded that the 
breach of this hallowed principle of the criminal justice system — the 
severing of the golden thread — could be justified under section 1. How 
so? Chief Justice Lamer’s rationale revolved around a single concern: 
the difficulty of proof and, hence, conviction. In claims of insanity, all of 
the relevant information was in the hands of the accused and, without the 
cooperation of the accused, which he felt could not be compelled, he 
argued that the Crown would be unable to discharge the normal criminal 
burden. This was particularly so given that the Crown would be forced to 
inquire into the accused’s mental state back at the time when the offence 
was committed. The tacit concern, of course, is that insanity might be 
readily feigned.70 On the strength of these observations, and having 
rejected the characterizations of the objective of section 16(4) offered by 
the Crown, Lamer C.J.C. explained that section 16(4) “is a purely 
evidentiary section whose objective is to relieve the prosecution of the 
tremendous difficulty of proving an accused’s sanity in order to secure a 
conviction”.71 He described the burden that would be imposed on the 
Crown if the rule were altered as “unworkable”72 and “impossible”73 and 
characterized the objective of the provision as being to avoid such a 
burden “and to thereby secure the conviction of the guilty”.74 With this 
legislative purpose in hand, he stepped through the Oakes75 test, finding 
a rational connection and concluding that this measure was minimally 
                                                                                                             
69 Chaulk, supra, note 63, at 1330. 
70 One wonders how this situation is meaningfully different from the de rigeur demand 
made for the Crown to prove mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt. It suggests the point made early 
in this piece, that there is a strong and strengthening tendency within Canadian law to view defences 
as secondary or subsidiary aspects of criminal responsibility, a perspective with which I strongly 
disagree. 
71 Chaulk, supra, note 63, at 1337. 
72 Id., at 1345. 
73 Id., at 1339. 
74 Id. 
75 Oakes, supra, note 62. 
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impairing given that any lower burden would, almost definitionally, fail 
to meet this objective.  
The most interesting portion of Lamer C.J.C.’s majority reasons 
came when he addressed what this all meant for the general balancing at 
the third stage of the section 1 proportionality test. Section 16(4) 
represented a compromise designed to balance “three important societal 
interests: avoiding a virtually impossible burden on the Crown; 
convicting the guilty; and acquitting those who truly lack the capacity 
for criminal intent”.76 To be sure, there would be deleterious impacts on 
the presumption of innocence; but the Court concluded that there was a 
pragmatic need for some give and take to ensure that “the Crown not be 
encumbered with an unworkable burden”.77 The majority in Chaulk 
viewed this as a justifiable compromise, one expressed in a remarkable 
coda: 
The result of this compromise is that some guilty people will be 
acquitted and will be dealt with via the “L.G.W. system”, and some 
insane (and therefore not guilty) people will be convicted and will be 
stigmatized and punished as criminals.78 
Justice Wilson’s separate reasons in Chaulk79 are usually remembered 
for their expression of her strict approach to the Oakes80 test and her 
demand for a strong evidentiary basis for the justification of limits on 
Charter rights.81 She criticized Lamer C.J.C.’s analysis for justifying the 
breach of “one of the most, if not the most, fundamental tenet of our 
criminal justice system”82 on the basis of an imagined possibility of an 
                                                                                                             
76 Chaulk, supra, note 63, at 1344. 
77 Id., at 1345. 
78 Id., at 1344 (emphasis added). “L.G.W.” refers to the Lieutenant Governor’s warrant, 
under which accused found not guilty by reason of insanity were, at the time, detained for 
psychiatric treatment. 
79 Chaulk, supra, note 63. 
80 Supra, note 62. 
81 See, e.g., Wilson J.’s dissent in R. v. Lee, [1989] S.C.J. No. 125, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1384 
(S.C.C.). On her posture towards s. 1, see Kent Roach, “Justice Bertha Wilson: A Classically 
Liberal Judge” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 193, and Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 50, at 282-83. 
82 Chaulk, supra, note 63, at 1362. Justice Wilson’s emphasis on the presumption of 
innocence and her strict approach to the Crown’s burden of proof is also evidenced in her decision in R. 
v. Bernard, [1988] S.C.J. No. 96, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833 (S.C.C.), which concerned the relevance of 
evidence of intoxication to proof of mens rea. Although she agreed with McIntyre J.’s conclusion that 
the evidence in the case was not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the minimal intent necessary 
to make out the general intent offence of sexual assault, she disagreed that self-induced intoxication 
ought to be treated as a substitute form of mens rea. Justice Wilson thus placed herself between the 
positions taken by McIntyre J. and Dickson C.J.C. (who would have discarded altogether the rule in 
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evidentiary problem for the Crown. To this end, Wilson J. canvassed the 
experience and jurisprudence in the United States, where many states did 
not place the burden to prove insanity on the accused.83 She noted that, in 
the 1895 case Davis v. United States,84 Harlan J. had placed the onus on 
the government to disprove insanity and concluded that “[t]he fact that this 
decision has stood unchallenged for almost a century tends to persuade me 
that the lower burden on the accused has not created a pressing and 
substantial problem in American society.”85 Drawing heavily upon the 
research of Professor Gerry Ferguson, she examined the legal experience 
in a number of U.S. jurisdictions that did not impose the reverse burden, 
finding no evidence that placing the burden on the Crown was in any way 
“unworkable”. Furthermore, she surveyed recommendations made by law 
reform bodies in Canada, the U.S. and the United Kingdom, all of which 
supported her view.  
Yet more than an expression of a strict posture towards justification, 
dealing as it does in the stuff of doubt and guilt, one finds in her decision 
a strong reflection of her disposition towards criminal judgment. Her 
insistence on empirical attention to the lived experience of the law in 
jurisdictions that did not impose the reverse onus in insanity cases 
demonstrates a willingness to bracket the substantial weight of history to 
critically examine received wisdom in the criminal law, where she 
keenly felt the stakes to be so very high. Her reasons are infused with a 
cognizance of the fearsome implications of criminal judgment. She cites 
Dickson C.J.C. in Oakes, emphasizing that “[a]n individual charged with 
a criminal offence faces grave social and personal consequences, 
including potential loss of physical liberty, subjection to social stigma 
and ostracism from the community, as well as other social, psychological 
                                                                                                             
R. v. Leary, [1978] S.C.J. No. 39, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29 (S.C.C.)). “The real concern over the substituted 
form of mens rea arises”, she argued, as a question of the presumption of innocence “under s. 11(d) of 
the Charter” (at 889). To this end, she emphasized in her reasons that, even for general intent offences, 
“the Crown must still prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the required mental element of 
the intentional application of force” (at 888). Justice Wilson’s view was, of course, adopted by the 
Court in Daviault, supra, note 59.  
83 Justice Wilson noted (Chaulk, supra, note 63, at 1372) that in principle, to succeed in 
justifying the breach of s. 11(d) 
the government would have to adduce evidence under s. 1 to show that this was a real social 
problem, that perfectly sane persons who had committed crimes were in significant numbers 
escaping criminal liability on tenuous insanity pleas and that something had to be done about 
it. 
However, Canada had no experience of a criminal law that did not impose the burden for insanity on 
the accused. It is for this reason that she looked to the United States. 
84 160 U.S. 469 (1895). 
85 Chaulk, supra, note 63, at 1377. 
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and economic harms.”86 Moreover, she saw and emphasized that the 
choice here was not between these grave consequences and simple 
leniency, noting that “a successful insanity plea is not an open door to 
freedom. It is a mandate for confinement in an appropriate institution for 
treatment rather than confinement simpliciter” and that “[t]he mean 
length of time of LGW detentions is six years and four months.”87  
This foregrounded awareness of the troubling violence involved in 
criminal judgment that one can detect in her reasons leads her back to a 
principled legal core. She places enormous emphasis on the role of the 
presumption of innocence as a cornerstone of our system of criminal 
judgment, noting in particular that it is “reflected in the axiom that ‘It is 
better that a guilty person go free than an innocent person be convicted 
of a crime’”.88 Indeed, this axiom — one that is so well known in our 
criminal law culture — is often amplified: better that 10… 100… 1,000 
guilty persons go free. It is a curious axiom understood solely in the 
terms of trials as exercises in the discovery of truth. The standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is one that, as the Court emphasized in 
Lifchus,89 is higher than that which we apply in even our most important 
personal decisions and, joined with a demand for juror unanimity, is a 
standard far more stringent than we ask of the scientific community. The 
axiom, and the twin principles of the presumption of innocence and 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt from which it arises, is generated out of 
an anxiety about the force and precariousness of the criminal law. It is to 
this axiom that Wilson J. trenchantly and rigorously adheres in Chaulk, 
asking, “do we wish to go down this path [of compromise] where such a 
fundamental tenet of our justice system … is at stake?”90 To Lamer 
C.J.C.’s claim that, for pragmatic reasons, a balance must be struck — 
even if this compromise means that certain accused who are insane will 
be convicted and subject to the violence that Wilson J. describes — she 
answers not only with an empirical refutation of the need for such a 
compromise, but also pointedly reponds: “in my view … it is better that 
a guilty person be found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed 
for psychiatric treatment than an insane person be convicted of a 
crime.”91 This caution must not be confused with timidity. Her boldness 
                                                                                                             
86 Oakes, supra, note 62, at 119. 
87 Chaulk, supra, note 63, at 1392. 
88 Id., at 1368. 
89 Lifchus, supra, note 54. 
90 Chaulk, supra, note 63, at 1375. 
91 Id., at 1374. 
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in taking on the wisdom of the common law belies the conclusion that 
her decision reflects a kind of timorousness in criminal judgment; rather, 
her judgment in Chaulk, and the posture towards criminal judgment that 
it reflects, demonstrates a jealous guarding of the safer path in the face of 
the fearsomeness of the criminal law. 
IV. THE PERILS OF ASSUMING THAT WE KNOW 
Justice Wilson’s sense of the moral burdens and ethical obligations 
that the criminal law places on the adjudicator is given further shape in 
the most celebrated of her criminal law judgments, Lavallee.92 Lavallee 
was the decision that, after years of strenuous call from scholars,93 finally 
drew the lived experience of the battered woman into the fabric of 
criminal jurisprudence in Canada. It was decided in the years following 
the tragic case of R. v. Whynot,94 in which the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal excluded the expert evidence of battered wife syndrome in the 
case of Jane Stafford, who had killed her husband after suffering 
horrendous physical and psychological abuse at his hands. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lavallee, written by Wilson J., was received with 
much acclaim — and certain notes of caution95 — as a long-awaited 
                                                                                                             
92 [1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (S.C.C.). 
93 See, e.g., Julie Blackman, “Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the 
Representation of Battered Women Who Kill” (1986) 9 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 227; see also Phyllis 
L. Crocker, “The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense” (1985) 
8 Harv. Women’s L.J. 121. 
94 [1983] N.S.J. No. 544, 9 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (N.S.C.A.).  
95 See Martha Shaffer, “R. v. Lavallee: A Review Essay” (1990) 22 Ottawa. L. Rev. 607, at 
609, arguing that the decision represented “an important step towards making the law of self-
defence responsive to the life experiences of women”, while also cautioning that “an uncritical 
acceptance of the ‘battered woman’s syndrome’ may reinforce sexist notions of women’s behaviour 
by falling prey to the same sex stereotypes that the ‘battered woman syndrome’ was initially devised 
to counter” (at 611). To a similar effect, see Isabel Grant’s contribution to Donna Martinson et al., 
“A Forum on Lavallee v. R.: Women and Self-Defence” (1991) 25 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23 [hereinafter 
“‘A Forum on Lavallee’”], entitled “The ‘Syndromization of Women’s Experience’” [hereinafter 
“‘The “Syndromization” of Women’s Experience’”], in which she applauds the effort to draw 
women’s lived experiences into the criminal law but warns about the use of the pathological 
language to describe these experiences. She argues at 52 that, trapped in the dichotomy of either 
being “reasonable ‘like a man’ or reasonable ‘like a battered woman’… the ‘reasonable’ woman 
may disappear”. See also Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs & Julie Tolmie, “Defending Battered 
Women on Trial: The Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitations” (1992) 16 Crim. L.J. 369; 
Christine Boyle, “The Battered Wife Syndrome and Self-Defence: Lavallee v. R.” (1990) 9 Can. J. 
Fam. L. 171 [hereinafter “‘The Battered Wife Syndrome’”]; and Marilyn MacCrimmon’s 
contribution to “A Forum on Lavallee”, entitled “The Social Construction of Reality and the Rules 
of Evidence” [hereinafter “‘Social Construction of Reality’”]. MacCrimmon commends aspects of 
the decision but warns of the reliance on expert psychiatric evidence, which “abstracts and re-
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triumph of a gendered analysis of the criminal law. Indeed, Justice 
Wilson herself viewed the case in this vein. In her biography of Justice 
Wilson, Ellen Anderson notes that in the time between the hearing in 
Lavallee and the issuance of the judgment, Justice Wilson had been 
reading extensively in preparation for her influential speech, “Will 
Women Judges Really Make a Difference?”96 Anderson quotes Justice 
Wilson as reflecting that while she was writing the speech, she 
realized that there were quite a number of aspects of the law that 
needed to be rethought from a gender perspective and that was one, 
that it was a chance to begin doing it by looking at the defence of self-
defence and how it was essentially male oriented. And I thought to 
myself, now here is a chance to give some leadership to what I have 
said in my speech that some aspects of the law must be reviewed 
because of the male bias and that was a chance to do that. …97 
Cautions voiced in the scholarship and subsequent jurisprudence 
about the potential misuse of aspects of the reasoning in Lavallee must be 
borne in mind.98 However, the case unquestionably stands as a profoundly 
important intervention in the law’s approach to and understanding of 
violence against women, an intervention based on the application of a 
principled and careful gender analysis to the criminal law.  
Justice Wilson’s judgment in Lavallee also resonated with certain of 
the themes that I have identified as constitutive of her posture towards 
criminal judgment, themes expressed particularly clearly in her treatment 
of criminal defences. Although this aspect of Lavallee has not been 
discussed in the critical literature, the decision stitches seamlessly into 
                                                                                                             
interprets” the woman’s experience. For a pre-Lavallee critique of the use of expert evidence of 
battered woman syndrome, see David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, “The Battered Woman 
Syndrome in the Age of Science” (1997) 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 67. 
96 Subsequently published as Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a 
Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 507. 
97 Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001), at 219. 
98 See Martha Shaffer, “R. v. Lavalee: A Review Essay” (1990) 22 Ottawa L. Rev. 607 and 
R. v. Malott, [1998] S.C.J. No. 12, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 123 (S.C.C.), in which L’Heureux-Dubé J. 
cautions against an overly rigid approach to the admissibility of evidence of the battered women’s 
experience. She notes, at para. 40, that a woman claiming self-defence in the context of an abusive 
relationship “should not be penalized for failing to accord with the stereotypical image of the 
archetypal battered woman”. See Martha Shaffer, “The Battered Woman Syndrome Revisited: Some 
Complicating Thoughts Five Years After R. v. Lavallee” (1997) 47 U.T.L.J. 1. In this follow-up 
article to a piece written shortly after the decision (Shaffer, “R. v. Lavallee: A Review Essay”), 
Shaffer canvassed the initial concerns raised by commentators and reviewed 35 subsequent cases to 
see if these concerns were borne out. Her analysis of those cases “suggests that the feminist 
concerns about the battered woman syndrome are being borne out, at least to some degree” (at 19). 
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the larger picture that I am painting of her posture in the criminal law. In 
Perka,99 Wilson J.’s decision was infused with the sentiment that the 
breadth of lived experience is simply too complex to admit of the kinds 
of ex ante judgments that the criminal law makes and the consequent 
commitment that it was necessary to facilitate the adjudicator’s critical 
assessment of the contextual rightness of a given act. In Chaulk,100 
Wilson J. demonstrated her resistance to complacency with the inherited 
concepts and assumptions of the criminal law, demanding that the 
rapidly shifting and complex social reality to which the criminal law 
must respond be informed by a strong evidentiary base founded in 
research and fact rather than in myth and presumption. Looking closely 
at the core theoretical intervention in Lavallee, one finds these 
dispositions and tacit commitments equally at play, dispositions and 
commitments themselves born, I have argued, of a due measure of 
appreciation of the fearsome nature of criminal judgment. But Lavallee 
is not simply a reflection of the themes developed in this chapter; it is a 
decision that, in its own right, adds to and enriches this picture of Justice 
Wilson’s criminal jurisprudence.  
The chilling facts of Lavallee are well known. Angelique Lyn 
Lavallee, a 22-year-old woman, was charged with the murder of Kevin 
Rust, her common law partner. Ms Lavallee had been the victim of 
serious physical and psychological abuse over the course of her three- to 
four-year relationship with Mr. Rust. The history and degree of abuse 
was supported by evidence adduced at her trial. On the night of the 
killing, following a party at their house, Mr. Rust had become abusive 
and aggressive towards Ms Lavallee. Based on the long pattern of 
violence that she had suffered at his hands, Ms Lavallee became terrified 
that he was going to beat her that night. She hid in her bedroom closet. 
Mr. Rust came upstairs looking for her and yelling. When he found her 
in the closet he grabbed her, pushed and struck her. At this point, he 
produced a gun, firing a shot through a window screen in the room. He 
then reloaded the gun and handed it to her. Ms Lavallee told the police 
that she contemplated killing herself. Mr. Rust threatened her: “wait till 
everybody leaves, you’ll get it then.”101 He warned her that either she kill 
him or he would “get” her. He smiled, turned to leave the room, and Ms 
Lavallee shot him in the back of the head. 
                                                                                                             
99 [1984] S.C.J. No. 40, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.). 
100 [1990] S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 (S.C.C.). 
101 Lavallee, [1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, at 857 (S.C.C.). 
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At her trial, Ms Lavallee pleaded self-defence and adduced 
psychiatric evidence from one Dr. Fred Shane who, having reviewed the 
facts of the case and interviewed Ms Lavallee, testified about battered 
spouse syndrome and the effect that it had on Ms Lavallee’s 
psychological condition. To the protestations of the Crown, the trial 
judge allowed this evidence to go before the jury and the jury found her 
not guilty. But the Manitoba Court of Appeal, which concluded that the 
trial judge had erred in admitting the evidence, overturned the result. 
Based on the preliminary views expressed by the judges in the post-
hearing conference at the Supreme Court of Canada, it seemed that Ms 
Lavallee’s prospects of victory were slim.102 Indeed, accepted doctrine 
appeared to present substantial obstacles for her defence. Section 34(2) 
of the Criminal Code,103 the relevant self-defence provision, required that 
the accused have both a reasonable apprehension of death and a 
reasonable belief that there were no legal alternatives to killing in self-
defence. Moreover, the provision had been interpreted as imposing a 
tacit “imminence” requirement, for how could one truly believe that 
there were no alternatives to self-help if the threat was not imminent? 
As I have suggested, Wilson J.’s reasons in Lavallee are a call for 
both recognition of the complexity of the lived experiences that the 
criminal law addresses and the need to criticize the adequacy of accepted 
and prevailing legal concepts in reflecting this complexity. Yet, at their 
conceptual core, her reasons are an elegant and forceful argument for the 
importance to just criminal judgment of a humble recognition of the 
limits of our knowledge. They are an admonition against the odious 
myopia that sets in when the person charged with the terrible task of 
judging another relaxes into a sanguine comfort about the general-
izability of one’s own knowledge. This is the insight that informs Wilson 
J.’s argument for the relevance of this expert evidence of battered spouse 
syndrome within the auspices of the doctrine that, at first blush, appeared 
to be so constraining. Her reasoning is a skilful exploration of the 
requirement for an objective measure of “reasonableness” in the two 
criteria for justified lethal self-defence at issue in the case. As she 
palpates the concept of reasonableness, she shows it to be a more supple 
and complex concept than the criminal law had theretofore assumed, one 
in need of a broadening infusion of unfamiliar facts.  
                                                                                                             
102 Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 97, at 219 and 221. 
103 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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Thus, Wilson J. explains that myth and assumption condemn the 
woman in Ms. Lavallee’s position: “Either she was not as badly beaten 
as she claims or she would have left the man long ago. Or, if she was 
battered that severely, she must have stayed out of some masochistic 
enjoyment of it.”104 Such assumptions are not the product of malice but, 
rather, of the inherent limitation of the adjudicator’s lived experience:  
If it strains credulity to imagine what the “ordinary man” would do in 
the position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not 
typically find themselves in that situation. Some women do, however. 
The definition of what is reasonable must be adapted to circumstances 
which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhabited by the 
hypothetical “reasonable man”.105 
The “average member of the public (or of the jury) can be 
forgiven”106 for coming to judgment bounded and informed by the limits 
of his or her knowledge. The law, however, must account for this 
constraint on just judgment; it is the role of the law of evidence — and 
the judge who is responsible for its integrity and evolution — to ensure 
that the criminal trial assists the adjudicator in stretching the limits of her 
or his understanding.107  
In Lavallee, this help came in the form of expert evidence. The 
relevance and, hence, admissibility of Dr. Shane’s evidence was 
precisely in helping the jurors to enlarge their sense of the contextually 
reasonable. Thus, when Wilson J. turned to the law’s requirement for a 
reasonable apprehension of death, she explained that the expert evidence 
can help to disturb the judge or juror’s assumption that one cannot 
reasonably feel a threat of grievous bodily harm or death when the 
attacker is leaving the room. The evidence of the psychological impact 
of cyclical abuse offers the trier of fact an understanding — perhaps 
otherwise unavailable to him or her — of the battered woman’s 
heightened sensitivity to the likely onset and severity of violence. 
Equally, when she considered the legal requirement that the accused 
reasonably believed that there was no alternative legal course of action 
open to her, Wilson J. noted that the expert evidence of the “traumatic 
                                                                                                             
104 Lavallee, supra, note 101, at 873. 
105 Id., at 874. 
106 Id., at 871. 
107 In this vein, in “The Battered Wife Syndrome”, supra, note 95, at 174, Boyle writes that 
“judicial willingness to be open to perspectives and research which challenge intuitive views of the 
‘facts’ is clearly important not only to the issue of self-defence but other issues as well.”  
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bonding”, “learned helplessness”108 and reluctance to disclose abuse to 
outsiders that could afflict the battered woman should be offered to the 
jury. This information can help meet the juror’s ill-informed, if 
cognitively explicable, question: “if the violence was so intolerable, why 
did the appellant not leave her abuser long ago?”109 
In the course of her reasoning, Wilson J. compellingly exposed the 
ways in which history continued to inform and distort in gendered ways 
both the law’s received understanding of self-defence and the manner in 
which a juror might reason about the actions of a battered woman. She 
put the concept of “imminence” back in its place as a judicial gloss 
influenced by “the paradigmatic case of a one-time bar-room brawl 
between two men of equal size and strength”.110 When a judge was 
forced to critically interrogate the received orthodoxies of the criminal 
law, it became manifestly clear that to continue in thrall to this paradigm 
would be “tantamount to sentencing [a battered woman] to ‘murder by 
installment’”.111 She noted the hypocritical way in which the demand to 
flee was deployed against battered women, observing that “traditional 
self-defence doctrine” did not impose an obligation to flee and that “[a] 
man’s home may be his castle but it is also the woman’s home even if it 
seems to her more like a prison in the circumstances.”112 But the central 
message of Lavallee was as much about the perils of assuming that we 
know as it was about the historical bias of the law. That this idea is the 
pivot point for her reasons is made plain when she begins her analysis of 
the core issues in the case by noting the clear need for assistance from 
experts in areas such as engineering or pathology. In such matters, “the 
paucity of the lay person’s knowledge is uncontentious”.113 The critical 
                                                                                                             
108 In “The ‘Syndromization of Women’s Experience’”, supra, note 95, at 52, Grant argued 
that Justice Wilson’s reliance on the psychiatric concept of “learned helplessness” could prove 
misleading: “It is not necessarily a ‘battered woman’s’ helplessness that renders her killing 
reasonable; it is the repetition and regularity of the abuse to which she has been subject and her 
perception of the threat to her life or safety.”  
109 Lavallee, supra, note 101, at 884. 
110 Id., at para. 41. In “Social Construction of Reality”, supra, note 95, MacCrimmon draws 
from the psychological literature on cognitive models when she describes the “bar room brawl” as a 
“schema” used by judges and juries to understand and evaluate the behaviour of the accused in 
situations of self-defence, a schema whose premises are often inapposite when applied to women.  
111 Lavallee, id., at 883, quoting from State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. 1986), at 
1271. 
112 Lavallee, id., at 888-89. In her contribution to “A Forum on Lavallee”, supra, note 95, at 
60, entitled “A Duty to Retreat”, Christine Boyle uses the decision in Lavallee as the basis for an 
insightful critical evaluation of whether the Canadian law of self-defence should impose a duty to 
retreat. See also “The Battered Wife Syndrome”, supra, note 95, at 176-77. 
113 Lavallee, id., at 870.  
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difficulty arises because we are not so cautious about our knowledge of 
the lives of others: 
The need for expert evidence in these areas can … be obfuscated by 
the belief that judges and juries are thoroughly knowledgeable about 
“human nature” and that no more is needed. They are, so to speak, 
their own experts on human behaviour.114 
But they — we — are not; and the peril of not seeing this is the 
unjust infliction of state violence and the inhuman withholding of 
compassion. 
In a fashion that is deeply interesting, but also troubling in what it 
discloses about the limits of our vision, much in Wilson J.’s judgment in 
Lavallee was not “new”.115 The law of expert evidence was then, as it is 
now, predicated on the idea that judges and jurors sometimes need help 
to do justice in a given case. Experts provide a “ready-made inference”116 
at the points at which the adjudicator’s knowledge runs out. And, while 
meaningfully complicating it, Wilson J. emphasized and confirmed the 
need for the jury to assess the reasonableness of the accused’s 
perceptions in matters of self-defence. What was new was the acuity 
with which she saw that the incomplete and gendered deployment of 
these concepts had perpetrated injustice. Here she found the cure in a 
call for the adjudicator to take seriously the life and perspective of the 
accused. In this, one finds that Lavallee participates in a broader vision 
that Justice Wilson seems to have defended in her criminal law 
jurisprudence. Another expression of this broader vision was her 
resistance to the attenuation of subjective standards of mens rea in the 
criminal law.117 The ready acceptance of objective measures of fault is 
                                                                                                             
114 Id., at 871. For an article setting the use of expert evidence in Lavallee in historical 
context, see Kimberley White-Mair, “Experts and Ordinary Men: Locating R. v. Lavallée, Battered 
Woman Syndrome, and the ‘New’ Psychiatric Expertise on Women within Canadian Legal History” 
(2000) 12 Can. J. Women & L. 406. 
115 For an argument to this effect, see Lee Stuesser, “The ‘Defence’ of ‘Battered Woman 
Syndrome’ in Canada” (1990) 19 Man. L.J. 195. 
116 R. v. Abbey, [1982] S.C.J. No. 59, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 24, at 42 (S.C.C.), per Dickson J. 
There are, of course, also very real risks in using expert evidence, dangers that the Court has itself 
emphasized. See, e.g., R. v. Mohan, [1994] S.C.J. No. 36, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, at 11 (S.C.C.): 
Dressed up in scientific language which the jury does not easily understand and submitted 
through a witness of impressive antecedents, this evidence is apt to be accepted by the jury 
as being virtually infallible and as having more weight than it deserves. 
117 See especially R. v. Tutton, [1989] S.C.J. No. 60, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Tutton”]; and R. v. Waite, [1989] S.C.J. No. 61, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1436 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Waite”], in which she argued for a subjective conception of criminal negligence, a 
battle that, again, she seems to have ultimately lost. See also R. v. Docherty, [1989] S.C.J. No. 105, 
188 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
hubristic; in the fearsome field of the criminal law, this makes it 
dangerous. By definition, objective measures of fault demand a comfort 
in our assessments of what the other person ought to have known or 
ought to have done, a kind of comfort that Wilson J. wrote against in 
Lavallee and for which she prescribed the onerous discipline of 
attempting to understand the mind and perspective of the other.  
No modern thinker has wrestled more deeply with the nature of 
judgment, law and politics in the face of horrifying crime than Hannah 
Arendt. Observing the trial of Adolf Eichmann influenced her life’s 
work and her reports from that trial give us as deep a set of insights as 
we have into the complexities of evil and blame.118 In response to the 
controversy following publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt 
wrote a short essay entitled “Truth and Politics”.119 In it, one finds an 
elegant, if deeply challenging, claim about the nature and conditions of 
just judgment:  
I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different view 
points, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are 
absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not 
blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and 
hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a 
question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like 
somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of 
being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The 
more people’s standpoints I have present in my mind while I am 
pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel 
                                                                                                             
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 941 (S.C.C.); and Danielle Pinard, “The Constituents of Democracy: The Individual 
in the Work of Madame Justice Wilson” (1992) 15 Dal. L.J. 81, at 105, in which Pinard suggests 
that Wilson J.’s subjectivist approach to criminal fault “seems to rest ultimately on the necessary 
respect, by the state, for the inherent dignity of the individual”. Brudner, whose subjectivist 
commitments are themselves explicitly based on a Hegelian respect for personhood, concurs with 
Wilson J.’s conclusion in Tutton, arguing that “negligence, gross or otherwise, has no place in the 
criminal law and that the Tuttons are therefore innocent of criminal (though not necessarily all) 
wrongdoing”. (Alan Brudner, The Unity of the Common Law: Studies in Hegelian Jurisprudence 
(Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1995), at 221.) Don Stuart, Canadian 
Criminal Law: A Treatise, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007), at 268, criticizes Wilson J.’s 
approach in Tutton and Waite as “one of doublespeak” in which “[t]here is a commitment to the 
aware state of mind approach but, when it does not achieve a satisfactory result, the concept of 
wilful blindness is distorted to achieve a conviction.” Despite this critique, Stuart is also a general 
proponent of subjective forms of fault in criminal offences as “the fairest basis for state punishment” 
(at 280). 
118 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: 
Viking Press, 1963). 
119 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought 
(London: Penguin Books, 2006), at 223-59. 
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and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for 
representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my 
opinion. It is this capacity for an “enlarged mentality” that enables men 
to judge...120 
Embedded, as she was, in the practical exigencies of a criminal 
justice system and faced with the enormous stakes and responsibility of 
criminal judgment, this kind of representative thinking — this “enlarged 
mentality” that makes possible good judgment — is what, at core, 
Wilson J. demanded in her reasons in Lavallee.  
V. CONCLUSION: A DUE MEASURE OF FEAR 
In many respects, we are well rid of the kind of anxiety and fear that 
characterized the act of criminal judgment for much of the history of the 
common law trial. That fear was born, in equal parts, of an unforgiving 
top-down public theology that served as a real constraint on human 
freedom and of a time in which punishment was bloody in the extreme. 
Most people in Canada today do not view their public duties as infused 
with a religious significance,121 and even those who do are not subject to 
the kind of deep and constant anxiety that seems to have inflected the 
world out of which our modern criminal trial emerged. And despite the 
great violence and consequent harm that persists in the imposition of 
criminal punishment, it is an unmitigated good that Canada no longer 
meets crime with the state-sanctioned spilling of blood. We are wrong, 
though, if we view the development of modern Anglo-Canadian law and 
legal institutions as a story of clear or inexorable moral progress. Despite 
their harshness, this old world view and these gruesome practices 
                                                                                                             
120 Id., at 237. 
121 A telling case in point is the reaction of Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin, 
both Roman Catholics, to the Vatican’s insistence that it was the duty of the Catholic politician to 
take all measures to resist the legal recognition of same-sex marriage. See Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions 
Between Homosexual Persons (Nairobi: Pauline Publications Africa, 2003). “Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith” is the modern name for the oldest of the congregations of the Roman Curia, 
once infamously active under the name “Holy Office of the Inquisition”. The case of civil marriage 
commissioners who feel that their civil duties are justifiably circumscribed by their personal 
religious views stands as an important contemporary counter-example. For a discussion of this issue, 
see Robert Leckey, “Profane Matrimony” (2006) 21(2) C.J.L.S. 1, at 20-21; Bruce MacDougall, 
“Refusing to Officiate at Same-Sex Civil Marriages” (2006) 69(2) Sask. L. Rev. 351; and Geoffrey 
Trotter, “The Right to Decline Performance of Same-Sex Civil Marriages: The Duty to 
Accommodate Public Servants — A Response to Professor Bruce MacDougall” (2007) 70(2) Sask. 
L. Rev. 365. 
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imposed an ethical discipline on the adjudicator. When the act of 
criminal judgment was understood to be deeply perilous — a genuinely 
fearsome event — the judge, whether professional or lay, could not but 
question his warrant to stand in judgment of another. The adjudicator 
was keenly aware of the limits of his knowledge, the complexity of his 
moral world and the need to adhere to the safer path. This awareness 
inculcated a form of modesty and caution in the act of criminal 
judgment.  
As much as it has been concerned with painting a picture of Justice 
Bertha Wilson’s contributions to the criminal law, this piece has equally 
sought to pose the question of whether we are comfortable with the 
degree to which we see this ethic informing our contemporary practices 
of criminal judgment. Looking to three of her key interventions in the 
law of criminal defences, I have identified a unity in her posture towards 
criminal adjudication. The judgments that I have examined here are rich 
with a sense of the need for caution and humility in the use of the 
criminal law. It is a complex sentiment composed of a number of 
aspects, and each case exposes a somewhat different dimension. Her 
reasons in Perka122 insist on the need for maintaining a means by which 
we can push back on the normative capaciousness of the criminal law’s 
ex ante judgments about rightness or wrongness, a need that arises from 
the intrinsic complexity of the world with which the criminal law must 
interact. In Chaulk,123 she forcefully sought to resist the reversal of the 
burden of proof in the law of insanity, a stance that so clearly reflected 
her commitment to the safer path in criminal judgment. And in 
Lavallee,124 Justice Wilson sounded a resonant call for the indispensable 
role in just judgment of critical self-reflection on the limits of one’s 
knowledge and experience. I have focused on these three cases and the 
illuminating area of criminal defences but, once seen, one can detect 
these commitments and the overarching sentiment that animates them 
throughout her work in the criminal law. Whether in her generous 
interpretation of the Charter’s criminal law protections,125 her attitude 
                                                                                                             
122 [1984] S.C.J. No. 40, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.). 
123 [1990] S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 (S.C.C.). 
124 [1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (S.C.C.). 
125 See, e.g., her judgments in Clarkson v. R., [1986] S.C.J. No. 20, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383 
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towards the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2),126 or her 
memorable defence of liberty in the face of the coercive force of the 
criminal law in Morgentaler,127 her posture had a particular integrity. Her 
work in the criminal law reflects a keen appreciation of the violence and 
precariousness of the criminal law and an abiding discomfort — a due 
measure of fear — in criminal judgment. 
Certain of Justice Wilson’s criminal law judgments, such as 
Lavallee128 and R. v. Bernard,129 have had a significant and direct impact 
on the shape of modern Canadian criminal law. Some others, like 
Perka130 and Morgentaler,131 have exerted a more indirect but abiding 
influence. Yet in the ethical dimension explored in this piece, our recent 
experience of criminal justice in Canada seems to have drifted 
substantially from Justice Wilson’s vision. Parliament has, in recent 
times, shown a misguided and bellicose confidence in the use of the 
criminal law to attend to social ills, adopting a “tough-on-crime” agenda 
that peddles a more aggressive use of a legal tool that is neither our most 
effective nor our most humane. But even in the jurisprudence, the 
contemporary influence of this humility and caution in the criminal law 
seems all too absent. In two of the three crucial judgments that I have 
described, Justice Wilson’s reasons stood alone and have not been 
picked up in subsequent Canadian jurisprudence. Throughout this piece, 
I have pointed to certain ways in which contemporary Canadian criminal 
law doctrine has moved in the direction of more confidence and less 
restraint: compared to when Justice Wilson was on the Court, 
confessions are easier to admit into evidence, objective measures of 
blame have flourished and burdens for criminal defences have shifted to 
the accused. We are more content to deny bail than at any point since the 
Charter was introduced and now afford the police investigative latitude 
unknown even at common law.132 Although the tendencies are far from 
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uniform,133 they are nevertheless troubling. Happily, even if not strongly 
reflected in the ethos currently animating our system of criminal justice, 
a due sense of the fearsomeness of the criminal law and the demands that 
this places on the individual engaged in the act of criminal judgment is 
preserved in the jurisprudence of Justice Bertha Wilson, an ethical 
resource to which we can turn and a voice of conscience that we ought to 
heed.  
 
                                                                                                             
133 One can, of course, point to certain cases that suggest a sense of criminal judgment more 
sympathetic to Wilson J.’s view. The expansion of the law of duress in R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. 
No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.), is a case in point. 
